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Redrawing Borders in Africa: Norms and Exceptions
Andrew Kuntz

ABSTRACT
Stability is a central component in the operation of the international system.
Reflecting its necessity, the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty are
deeply engrained in international law. Secession challenges these tenets through the right
to self-determination. However, the right to self-determination is not a generalized right
to secede, and secession remains a rare occurrence. This has held uniquely true to Africa,
where colonialism left a legacy of non-viable states and ripe conditions for secession, yet
South Sudan and Eritrea have been the only cases in the half of a century since
decolonization. Existing research on secession has primarily sought to understand where
it occurs and why. A deficit in the literature of secession exists as to what differentiates
successful cases of secession from failures.
Drawing local, regional and international factors of significance from case study
analysis of Eritrea, South Sudan, Katanga, Biafra and Somaliland, this research finds that
the presence of high-intensity, long duration civil war that generates regional instability
strongly correlates with the outcome of a secession. The presence of physical or material
resources does not necessarily enhance the viability of a secession, and the strength of a
separatist legal claim as well as their fulfillment of the qualifications of statehood are
dependent on other factors.
Introduction
Stability is central to the existence of the international state system, and the
framework of international law reflects this (Shaw 443–4). The need for stability is
reflected in formal international legislation, and in the existence of international regimes
on issues of border alteration, state recognition, and the destruction of states (Krasner
185–205). In addition, the majority of domestic and international case law sets
sovereignty and territorial integrity above self-determination (Shaw 444–5, 449). The
principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity form the structural foundation of
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that stability. These principles protect the status quo by institutionalizing the permanence
of existing states, thereby discouraging separatism within states and rejecting the
potential for annexation by other states (390–1; Jackson 23).1 However, these deeply
rooted aspects of the international system conflict with the right to self-determination and
the broader regime on human rights (Shaw 443). Though the implications of this conflict
remain a point of contention, its existence represents a diversification of the means that
actors in the international system believe are necessary to achieve stability, security, and
power (Shaw 1036).
The end of the Cold War marked a shift from the broad challenges of nuclear
warfare and proxy conflicts to delicate issues of state failure, ethnic and sectarian
violence, and trans-national terrorism. Conventional solutions to communal conflict such
as sanctions, economic and humanitarian aid, and peacekeeping interventions have
proven to be only marginally effective and generally come at significant cost. As a result,
alternative methods of resolution, such as secession, have taken a more prominent
position among scholars and policy makers (Johnson 140–1, 143). Unsurprisingly, the
discourse on secession has failed to translate into accepted practice. International laws
and norms regarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity makes secession a rare
occurrence in the international system (143, 148, 165).2 Nevertheless, amidst an
interconnected international economy and concern for human rights, the destabilizing
effects of internal conflicts as well as fears of providing bases for terrorism have ensured
that secession remains a possibility.3 When it does occur, cases of secession offer unique
insight into the framework of the international system and its components because they
take place at a crossroads between local, regional and international actors, laws, regimes,
and interests.
Compared to other regions of the world, Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed high
levels of post-decolonization political violence (Gleditsch 616). This violence can be
attributed to a colonial history that left African states with weak government institutions,
1

By state sovereignty, I am referring to negative state sovereignty, or the freedom from outside interference
and intervention. Further, I acknowledge that this principle is far from inviolable, or in other words always
obeyed, however its existence does limit both the extent of such interference, and the necessary level of
power a state must possess to undermine or ignore the sovereignty of another state.
2
Secession briefly became quite common in the 1990s when the Soviet Union Disintegrated.
3
Ibid.
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arbitrary borders, and undiversified commodity driven economies that are conducive to
fueling conflict. These traits strongly correlate with separatism, which has led predictive
models to regard Sub-Saharan Africa as uniquely prone to secession (Englebert, Hummel
403).
In contrast to these expectations, empirical analysis demonstrates Sub-Saharan
Africa to have a deficit of secession (403). In the 56 years since the start of
decolonization, there have only been two successful secessions in Sub-Saharan Africa:
that of Eritrea in 1994, and South Sudan in 2011. Existing research has explored this
deficit and the two exceptions in the interest of understanding why separatist sentiment
arises where it does (403; Hannum, Babbitt 3). However, the current literature has failed
to address the question as to what differentiates Eritrea and South Sudan from other
major cases of separatism in Africa, such as Biafra in Nigeria, Katanga in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Somaliland in Somalia.
Recognizing the importance of secession and the opportunity it affords to learn
about the international system, this thesis seeks to address this question. Case study
analysis of Eritrea, South Sudan, Katanga, Biafra, and Somaliland is employed to identify
significant local, regional, and international factors that serve as determinants in the
outcome of a secession. This thesis finds that high-intensity, long duration civil wars that
generate external instability have the strongest positive correlation with the outcome of a
secessionist movement. Research also indicates that the presence of geographical
resources or commodities do not necessarily enhance the viability of a secession, which
disputes existing theoretical work on the connection between resources and secession.
Likewise, the strength of the legal claim of a secessionist movement and their fulfillment
of the qualifications of statehood do not necessarily boost the viability of a secession. The
impact of these factors may be significant but are dependent on other factors.
The fate of a secession is ultimately dependent on the decision of existing states
as to whether or not extend recognition. As recognition of a secession leaves the
recognizing state vulnerable to external consequences (unless the host state has already
dissolved or agreed to the secession) and internal consequences, the cost of inaction must
outweigh the potential price of recognition.
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Understanding Secession
Secession is a process aimed at creating a new sovereign state on territory
internationally recognized as forming part of an existing state (Englebert, Hummel;
Radan 20). The process of secession is completed with the acquisition of sufficient
official international recognition as a sovereign state, and the obtainment of membership
as such in the United Nations (Englebert, Hummel 403; Radan 20). U.N. membership is
necessary to ensure the juridical sovereignty of a state, without which the secession
remains vulnerable to elimination by the host state.4
What Motivates Secession?
Discourse on the motivations behind secession can be divided into two
interrelated categories: overarching arguments as to the decision-making structure of a
secession, and substantive motivational factors. Opportunity structures, also known as
rational-choice models, dominate the majority of explanatory literature, which
conceptualizes nationalism and secessionist movements as constructs of cost-benefit
analysis by rational actors (Pavkovic, Radan 41–2). For example, Paul Collier and Anne
Hoeffler argue that secession is driven by economic gains, and that violations of human
rights do not play a significant role (Hannum, Babbitt 3). A small portion of the literature
asserts that non-quantifiable factors that are discounted by opportunity structures, such as
history and culture, contribute to the probability of secession (Pavkovic, Radan 42). They
argue that existing opportunity models fail to account for the capacity of individuals to
diverge from the group (42, 48). They also believe that factors external to a conflict may
alter the cost-benefit analysis of the actors involved, such as technological advancements
or shifts in the values of the international system (42, 48).
The rational choice model holds obvious weight for understanding secession.
However, individuals are not entirely rational actors. Their perspectives, and thus the
elements analyzed in a cost-benefit analysis, are not limited to those that are quantifiable.
Considered in this way, and because quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors do not

4

Given this, secession as a method of state creation favors the Constitutive Theory of state recognition.
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inherently conflict, I propose an alternative superstructure that takes opportunity
structures, non-quantifiable factors, and external shifts into account.5
As with any other situation where a group is involved in a conflict or dispute, two
potentially separate but interactive mechanisms are at work: an organizing factor and a
mobilizing factor (Pavlovic, Radan 42; Englebert, Hummel 403). This does not discredit
existing research, but instead provides a simplified structure through which concepts may
be applied and examined (42; 403). The structure of any secession may be analyzed
through identifying one or more elements that could serve as one or both of these factors,
and may be broadly categorized into four bases:
1) Identity
2) Resources and Sovereignty
3) State Policies and Behavior
4) Viability Modifiers
Each of these factors may serve as both the organizer and motivator of a secession
movement, however in most cases a dynamic relationship exists between them. Factors
may reinforce one another, and the motivations behind secession may shift over time.
This can occur for a variety of reasons, for example in reaction to the positions of
existing states, or if a Diaspora or other another external support base is involved. Such
groups may offer a distorted or fictional explanation to justify further support for the
conflict.
Identity and Secession
Relevant literature on the construction and manipulation of identity is centered on
the concept that ethnic and national identities are endogenous to “social phenomena such
as mass politics and capitalism, both in how and when they were created and in the nature
of their existence” (Green 4). As Elliot Green highlights in his work “On the Endogeneity
of Ethnic Secessionist Groups,” there are two schools of thought regarding the way in
which ethnically motivated political action may function: the elitist and the mass (5). The
work of Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and others represent the elitist school, which asserts
that elites manipulate concepts of ethnicity, creating and shaping feuds and hatreds that
5

The idea behind the need for this structure was to open the cost-benefit analysis theories to external
factors within the scope of this paper. I grant that this may be considered unnecessary, or irrelevant, as such
a structure may already exist in an alternate form.
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shape the groups themselves (5). In contrast, the mass school “ascribes power to all
members of a given ethnic group, who collectively choose to associate based on the
material benefits they can potentially possess as a group” (Bates 152–171).
In either case, individuals possess a repertoire of potential identities that they can
utilize, and through which others attempt to appeal to them, depending on the situation
(Posner 2). The basis for identity as an interactive variable lies with the principles of
identity construction and identity choice (2). Identity construction defines the array of
political identities that may be mobilized within a society (2). Sub-national, national, and
international markets, events, and political institutions determine traits that are viable for
mobilization (2). 6 These elements create the bases of identity by shaping the competitive
arena as well as the incentives for individuals to participate. These choices achieve
society-wide impact as individuals coordinate their decisions in response to these bases
(3).
The array of identity options available to an individual depends on their
background and the dynamics that determine their political saliency. Individuals then
utilize those identities that they believe best enable them to achieve their goals (Posner
2). The fault lines of identity that emerge then represent an aggregation of individuals’
decisions as to what coalition will be the most political and economically beneficial to
join or create (2–3). Benefits are not solely positive in nature; people may align
themselves with one another for the purpose of protection or the mitigation of detrimental
policies and events. In other words, identity operates as an organizing factor for secession
in the pursuit of positive benefits, and economic and political incentives operate as
factors of motivation. On the other hand, identity may operate as both the point of
organization and motivation where negative benefits, like protection and survival are
concerned (the notions of positive and negative are the same as those used with aspects of
state sovereignty).
Understanding the structure and operation of identity coalitions is important to
understanding secession. When individuals are unable to manipulate their situation to
obtain access to the resources, power, and protection of the sovereign state, or are
6

Theoretically any characteristic could serve as a viable identity basis for mobilization; however, in
practice greater variation among those possessing such traits effectively rules out more minor features, such
as hair color or favorite colors.
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otherwise unable to participate in or protect against the government, they may seek to
secede. This may be in part due to the way in which identity can modify the cost-benefit
analysis of a potential or ongoing secessionist campaign. Notions of ethnic or religious
solidarity give support to separatists through Diasporas, and other state and non-state
actors. Such groups may contribute to secessionist sentiment and fuel the conflict, as
“they tend to keep grievances alive, offer irredentist support, magnify beliefs in ethnic
purity, and provide funding to local organizations” (Englebert, Hummel 404). For
example, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and government of Somaliland have received
significant support from their respective Diasporas (404).
Ethnicity, Ideology and Regionalism
Ethnicity and ideology have dynamic relationships with processes of identity
formation. Nationalist sentiment may be built upon one or both of these, or it may
conflict with them. In relation to secessionist movements, the two may be distinct or
overlap as unifying factors. For example, in South Sudan, concepts of blackness aligned
with Christianity and Animism within a number of different separatist groups (Hannum
308–9). However, regionalism can serve as another basis for identity, as the case of
Eritrea demonstrates (Pavkovic, Radan 497).
By nature of their mechanics, ethnicity, ideology, and regionalism differ in effect
as the foundations of secessionist movements. Ethnicity provides a strong basis for
separatist movements, as it is perceived to be relatively exclusive. Similarities in
language, culture, history, and more importantly the way in which others perceive and
interact with potential members of an ethnic group, make it a prudent base for
secessionist claims. Concepts of ethnic unity and purity, which may be utilized by people
on the ground, or by members of a Diaspora, encourage the construction of support
networks (Posner 3).
Ideology, particularly religion, being more expansive and inclusive lacks the
rallying strength of ethnicity or culture. That being said, ideology may motivate
secessionist movements by garnering external support from states and non-state actors
such as religious institutions. Ideology may also skew the cost-benefit analysis of
potential separatists, given the intangible elements involved.

Published by KnightScholar, 2013

7

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2012 [2013], Art. 16

262
Regionalism is a form of Segmentary Opposition, and exists as a reactionary subnationalist identity (Barth 5).7 Though not necessarily possessing the unifying strength of
ethnicity and the support networks of religion, regionalism represents a critical basis for
mobilization as it presents fewer points of internal dispute amongst separatists.
Regionalism represents a form of opposition coalescence, which develops when common
opposition to a group or entity induces the alignment of multiple identities to form a new
base. This may also occur among ideological and ethnic identities.
Resources and Sovereignty8
Economic incentives and material benefits are generally regarded as the dominant
determinants and explanations of civil war and secession (Hannum, Babbitt 4; Englebert,
Hummel 404). Existing research has shown a strong correlation between the presence of
natural resources and instances of separatism (Ross 337–8). This work has produced a
range of explanations for this relationship; however, they tend to center on the control of
resources as a motivation for two groups: coalitions that would benefit from a secession
and the existing sovereign state (337–8). When a region or group considers itself
economically disadvantaged by its relations with the sovereign state, it may “reassess the
relative costs and benefits of belonging to a national union, and in turn contemplate
seceding” (Bookman 39). Interestingly, such a conclusion is not unique to regions that
may be considered rich or poor (39).
The opportunity to control and profit from natural resources offers a strong
incentive for local actors, though their course of action may depend on the type of
resources. Resources are not limited to material goods, alternatives such as coastal
access, or state sovereignty may also be viewed as desirable to control (39). Groups may
launch a secessionist movement if they are not being provided sufficient services or
benefits by the central government and seceding would allow them to create or retain
necessary agricultural and material goods (Englebert). Where a group or region is
deprived of their autonomy and authority, they may be motivated to secede to reacquire

7

Segmentary Opposition refers to the tendency of groups to put aside their own conflicts and ally when
faxing a greater external threat.
8
I base my perspective of natural resources on the broad definition used by Michael Ross in his work
“Natural Resources and Civil War,” pg. 19. These include oil, gas, precious stones, non-fuel minerals,
lumber, agricultural commodities and drugs.
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their power in a new state or force concessions by the central government (Hannum,
Babbitt 3).
Resources requiring significant infrastructure development, stability, and foreign
investment, such as oil, are more likely to motivate secessionist movements (Englebert,
Hummel 405). As the central government is capable of contesting agreements within its
territory, local actors desire sovereignty of their own (405). 9 In contrast, resources that
require little to no capital or foreign infrastructure and investment, such as diamonds, do
not require sovereignty to be extracted. In these cases, local actors back a local power,
rather than trying to secede (405; Nabudere 296).10
Sovereignty is an incentive in and of itself. Sovereign states can receive
development, food, arms aid, loans, and they have a domestic monopoly on violence.
Beyond these positive incentives, seceding states that leave a rump state behind tend to
emerge without the burden of debt, though that depends on the circumstances and
investments in the area seceding. That being said, where natural resources converge with
these considerations (potentially offering a means by which groups may fund opposition)
there is an increased change of foreign support and intervention (405; Hannum, Babbitt
34).
State Policies and Behavior
On a passive level, the condition of a state has the potential to motivate or
discourage a secessionist movement (Englebert, Hummel 406). The style of government
is less important than whether or not a state is able to combat a separatist movement.
Similarly, levels of political change or democratic institutions only matter in how they
affect the strength of the state. Weak or dysfunctional states may motivate secessionist
movements as groups seek to provide themselves with services that the state has failed to
provide. Somaliland is one such example, though it was initially a distinct state and

9

The perceived necessity for local sovereignty is due in part to the ability of the existing sovereign
government to oppose any such development or contracts, as well as the limitations of significant
development aid and governmental business entities regarding dealings with non-states.
10
It should be noted that in dealing with resources that are easily extracted and transported, it is plausible
that state policies and behavior may incline the people to seek to secede, though this may be counter-acted
in both cases by directly dealing with corporations and side- stepping the central or regional government.
An example of such behavior is found in the eastern provinces of the D.R.C. where various mining
companies such as Anglo-American and Banro-Gold have bartered with local populations and on-site
rebels to have access to mining sites and mineral rights.
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represents a relatively unique case (Paquin 153). Weak or dysfunctional states rely more
heavily on political violence, which may spill over into secessionist sentiment if
grievances are created in the process. States in transition, which are not necessarily weak
or dysfunctional, also may also provide the impetus for secession, as periods of
democratization and economic transition have an impact on identity dynamics and may
intensify identities, and in the process heighten security dilemmas (Englebert, Hummel
406).
The state actively constructs the cost-benefit analysis for potential separatists, as it
is able to influence which identity elements are relevant or politically viable. The
usefulness of any potential or existing coalition depends on the boundaries and identity
bases of the political arena. Policy shifts among state institutions alter these bases and the
shape of the political arena, and change the fault lines of identity. More directly, the state
is capable of creating or nullifying grievances amongst the population through its actions
and policies. These policies may be entirely politically aimed, such as the exclusion of a
region or group to solidify a base of power, though they have also been found to overlap
with the location of natural resources (Ross 34). In cases where valuable natural
resources reside in an outlying region of a country or where a relative minority exists,
states may engage in ‘pre-emptive repression’, or rather, campaigns of terror and
suppression (34).11
Viability Modifiers
Shifts at the system level, be it regional or international, alter the conditions of
possibility for secession. In other words, factors and events beyond the immediate context
of a potential secessionist effort impact the viability of an effort and the cost-benefit
analysis of a group considering separatism. I define these as ‘Viability Modifiers.’ A
viability modifier is any domestic, regional, or international factor that impacts the costbenefit analysis of a potential or existing separatist group. Thus, the judgment of a state
and a separatist movement may shift over time and take changes in the international
system into account.

11

The research of Michael Ross has shown such antagonistic activities and behavior to be relatively unique
to combating separatist efforts.
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A Viability Modifier may be separate from the previously listed factors, or may
represent a shift among them; for example, the price of a commodity in the international
market. Broadly speaking though, Viability Modifiers encompass everything from market
prices to shifts in norms and regimes relevant to secession: the right to self-determination,
territorial integrity, positions on partition and secession as policy options, and others. For
example, when the army in Mali launched a coup against the government, this was a
Viability Modifier for separatists in the northern part of the country, who announced their
independence and the creation of Azawad (Palus).
Differentiating these factors and understanding how they interact with one another
is critical to a broader discussion of secession. This is in part due to the deficit of material
on the subject. More importantly, understanding how factors can interact allows a more
thorough examination and analysis of different cases of secession. The ability to
recognize the organization and motivation factors of a secession is necessary to enable a
better understanding of how internal and external actors interact and why.
Why Africa: Africa as a Unique Setting for Secession
Africa is a unique setting for the study of secession, and the exploration and
identification of significant factors involved in determining the outcome of secessionist
efforts. As a region, Africa has a distinct relationship with secession, one that rests with
the nature and processes of African state formation, as well as the contemporary
conditions and characteristics of African states.
On the Nature of African State: Common Sense Secession
International state borders are the recognized delimitations of states’ sovereignty
and territory, as well as the area over which states are expected to exercise effective
control (Okhonmina 177–179). States maintain a dynamic relationship with their borders,
where the capacity of the state impacts the implications of its borders, yet its borders in
part determine the capacity of a state. However, state formation and territorial
consolidation have not been a uniform process throughout the world, and borders in
different regions have differing implications and effects.
The contemporary borders of African states exemplify this point, as they follow
the administrative boundaries of the European Colonial powers and which were
transformed into international borders through the principle of Uti Possidetis during
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decolonization (Ratner 595). These boundaries were designed arbitrarily in relation to the
reality on the ground, being drawn with the simplest methods to reduce conflict among
the European powers, without concern for demographic, geographic, or ethnographic
factors, or the construction of viable states (Herbst 25). In some cases nascent power
balances that had developed under colonial rule were disrupted as administrative zones
and were either absorbed or consolidated. As such, this change left them severely
disadvantaged within their new area and generally excluded from participation in
discussions and decision-making during decolonization (effectively denying them
independence). South Sudan and Cabinda are both examples of this practice (Southall
156, 158).
Decolonization raised the question as to whether the colonial borders should be
restructured in an effort to resolve their arbitrary basis. However, participating African
elites opted to maintain their respective borders as they were laid out prior to
independence (Ratner 595). African leaders argued that opening the borders up to
question could lead to violent and destabilizing conflict. European states backed this
decision as it allowed them to rapidly depart with little obligation to arbitrate or mediate
between different groups. Opposition to any efforts to alter or undermine the borders was
then engrained into the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, declaring the
existing boundaries inalterable (Org. of African Unity 17).
On the whole, African states differ from those of many other regions as they do
not represent the molding of identity through conflict, nor are they a reflection of the
dynamics of exercisable economic, military, and administrative power and competency
(Southall 153–156). Their boundaries were designed with neither ethnic identity nor the
future viability of the area in mind. Given these factors, both causes and means, Africa is
potentially endowed with not only a greater number of separatists, but separatists who
have a stronger argument than separatists from many other areas of the world.
Contemporary Conditions: The Secessionist Deficit as a Legitimizing Force
Decolonization enabled the formal transfer of control to African leaders.
However, they inherited states more in name than in capacity, as they had weak
institutions, societal fissures from divisive colonial policies, and vulnerable economic
structures centered on the exportation of raw resources and singular commodities (Herbst
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97, 118, 135, 140). As one might expect given these circumstances, in the 56 years since
decolonization began, Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed consistently high levels of
political violence and internal conflict (Englebert, Hummel 399).
The states of Sub-Saharan Africa possess a host of social, economic, geographic,
and state characteristics correlated with civil war and separatism (403–499). African
states are regarded as being relatively young and still undergoing the throes of national
integration and construction of a common identity (404). They consist of socially
heterogeneous and polarized populations whose groups commonly engage in zero-sum
interactions for control of the state (Englebert, Hummel 400). Significant reserves of
natural resources exist that may act as incentives for the initiation of conflict for other
internal and external actors, as well as being exported and sold by civil war combatants
and separatists to fund existing conflict (400). African states are commonly ‘culturally
alien’ to their populations, in contrast to states in other parts of the world, as a result of
their borders, capital placement, and the colonial indoctrination of African elites (400).
African states widely have weak records of evenly providing services and goods for their
citizens, and control over these institutions is commonly the basis for conflict and neopatrimonial loyalty systems. The logical derivative of these factors is that a significant
proportion of the political violence should be related to separatism.12
Yet as Pierre Englebert and Rebecca Hummel illuminate in their work “Let’s
Stick Together: Understanding Africa’s Secessionist Deficit”, secessionist conflict in
Africa is well below predicted levels (401). Between 1960 and 2005, separatism only
accounted for 27% of all domestic conflicts in Africa (400). Similarly, the levels of
separatism in Africa are notably lower than many other regions of the world. In the same
period of time, based on recorded instances of separatism, the average annual probability
of a secessionist conflict occurring in Africa was only .06%, in comparison to .16 % in
Asia, and .08% in the Middle East (and was matched by .06% probability of secession in
Europe) (402). Though the deficit of secessionist activity offers fewer case studies to
analyze, it deepens the gains of studying separatism in Africa, as those that do occur

12

As mentioned previously, civil war and secession are differentiated by the intent of the groups, however I
acknowledge the difficulty in determining a ‘critical date’ upon which to judge the true or dominant
motives of a group.
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should be more dire situations where internal actors have a more viable opportunity or are
more committed to seceding.
Examination of International Law: Viability of Secession
The international community does not recognize secession as a right. (Hannum
13). Yet “international law does not prohibit secession, whether voluntary or violent, but
it has neither recognized a right to secede nor identified even tentatively the conditions
that might give rise to such a right in the future” (14). In the place of such a right, the
viability of secession is reliant on a framework of distinct but interrelated aspects of
international legal principles: state creation, Uti Posessidetis, self-determination,
recognition, territory, and the privileged role of the state.
The Framework of Statehood and Recognition
Acquisition of a sovereign state necessitates secessionist movements to fulfill the
basic requirements of statehood as laid out in the 1993 Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government,
and the capacity to enter into relations with others states (Montevideo Convention).
However, these requirements are broadly defined and subjectively interpreted, which
makes fulfillment of these measurements of statehood relatively easy. This has in part
been enabled by the development of the right to self-determination, which has modified
the traditional circumstances and forms of these requirements (Shaw 183). No minimum
population number has been established; moreover, defined and settled boundaries are
not entirely necessary at the time of statehood. Instead, the area in question must be
contiguous and undeniably controlled by the government aspiring to acquire statehood
(183). The government has no necessary capacities or level of functionality beyond being
able to engage in legal relations as it sees fit, being able to legislate and enforce the
agreements it makes with states (181). This is the most crucial requirement of statehood,
as it necessitates not only effective control but the legality of exercising control in so far
as other states accept that legality and have a willingness to engage in relations by it.
The Montevideo Convention asserts that the existence of a state, and its
possession of statehood, is independent of recognition by other states, and as such is able
to defend its ‘integrity and independence’ regardless of its status as a recognized or
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unrecognized state (Montevideo). The Convention further states that the rights of other
states under international law form a limitation to the exercise of this right (Montevideo).
Legal theory on state recognition is divided between Declaratory Theory and
Constitutive Theory (Shaw 363). In accordance with the view of the Montevideo
Convention, Declaratory Theory argues that recognition is an acceptance by ‘existing
states’ of extant factual realities and circumstances (368). A new state, a category that
includes secession under this theory, will be legally constituted by its own efforts and
does not have to wait for recognition by other states, or the virtue of their consent to do
so (368). Opposing Declaratory Theory and contrasting the Montevideo Convention,
Constitutive Theory is set in the belief that states acquire “legal personality” and are
established as full subjects of international law through the act of recognition by other
states and by virtue of the will and consent of the international body of existing states
(368–9). The practice of recognition has shown to take a middle road between these two
theories. In concept, recognition indicates that the new state is capable of conforming to
the basic requirements of international law and satisfies the qualifications for statehood.
In practice, this rhetoric justifies highly politicized judgments of self-interest (372–3).
The Framework of Territory and Sovereignty
The international system is premised on the stability and supremacy of territorially
based states. The centrality of this concept is reflected in the framework of international
laws and norms, particularly in the principle of territorial integrity, which prohibits any
type of interference in the domestic affairs and territory recognized as being under the
jurisdiction of a state (443). The state itself rests on the notions of positive and negative
sovereignty (409). Positive sovereignty refers to the exclusive right of a state to exercise
authority over its territory (412). Negative sovereignty refers to the right of a state to be
free from external interference (412). At its core, the relationship between sovereignty
and territory rests upon the concept of title, in other words, the factual and legal
conditions that deem the ownership of territory, a relationship that while absolute in
domestic territorial questions, is relative concerning international territory (412).
Self-Determination as a Vector to Statehood
Separatists and advocates of secession as a policy cite the right to selfdetermination to justify and enable their claims; particularly where the borders have been
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formed by relatively artificial means (200). Self-determination evolved from a means of
protecting minority populations, and is defined as the right of ‘all peoples…to freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development’ (Basak 198). Self-determination was initially instated in international law
through the Treaty of Versailles and the Fourteen Points speech, and then integrated into
the encompassing framework of the U.N. Charter (198). However, the concept of selfdetermination as a right was further legalized in the 1996 International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
However, self-determination is not a generalized right of secession; international
law does not hold secession to be a right, nor does it regard self-determination as
intended to or able to dissolve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state. The
International Court of Justice has noted that all states have a right to territorial integrity
and sovereignty regardless of the process of their formation (198).
In line with this, the reach of such arguments are limited as self-determination is
engrained as being subservient to other principles of international law and its realization
must conform to the Charter of the United Nations, as well as other sources of
international law (228). Thus, though self-determination exists as part of an expanding
regime on human rights, its scope and applicability to secession is limited (230, 269).13
The Viability of Secession
As this examination has shown, the legal and logistical framework of the
international system and its norms oppose secession, and deny its viability. Yet,
international law remains an evolving subject, and the internal denial of the right to selfdetermination may induce the development of an acceptable and legally recognized
principle of external self-determination, or secession, through a series of exceptions.

13

Denial of the viability of secession through the right of self-determination was initially legalized in 1970
with the passage by the U.N. of the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The
Declaration of Friendly Relations defined self-determination employing similar language to the ICCPR and
the ICESCR before stating that ‘Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally, or in part, the territorial integrity or
political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour.’
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For now though, without significant incentives for major powers to extend recognition,
secession remains dependent on the agreement of the host state (whether voluntarily or
through the inability to obtain military victory over a secessionist movements that obtains
control over a significant percentage of territory) and the cost-benefit analysis of external
states to act or influence the negotiations.
Case Study Analysis: Tracing Secession and Identifying Differentiating Variables
The aim of this analysis is to draw out the factors that seem to be the significant
determinants of whether or not a secession will achieve statehood. Case study analysis is
employed to identify these determinants and, through examination of their contextual
roles, to understand how they impact the fate of a separatist movement. The case studies
are ordered by their similarity, progressing from the successful cases, to the failures, to
the exception. Each case study is broken into five sections. First, a brief overview of the
secession is given. Second, the origin of the conflict is identified and explored. Third, the
domestic, regional and international course of the secession is reviewed. Fourth, the
arguments and demands of the secessionist movement are examined in conjunction with
the basis of the conflict to determine their legality. The last section examines the costs of
the conflict, the presence of resources, and the involvement of external actors.
These case studies enable the compilation and discussion of potentially significant
determinants. These determinants are identified and judged before being used to construct
an investigative framework that is applied to all of the cases to see if any trends or
patterns are identifiable as to what differentiates failure from success.
Selection of Case Studies
Eritrea and South Sudan were selected for case analysis because in both cases,
separatists achieved statehood. Katanga and Biafra were both significant separatist
conflicts, in terms of the costs and the actors involved, yet failed to acquire statehood.
Lacking statehood despite possessing the most acceptable legal justification, Somaliland
offers a unique opportunity for analysis.
Eritrea: Overview
Eritrea emerged as the first and, as of then, only exception to the inviolability of
post-colonial African state borders. Eritrea was neither ethnically nor religiously
homogenous, but was bound by the experience of Italian colonialism and persecution by
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the Ethiopian State (Pavkovic, Radan 497). After 30 years of conflict, Eritrea attained
recognition as an independent sovereign state in 1993 after a U.N. monitored referendum
on independence, in which 98.5% of Eritreans supported independence (497). Ethiopia,
the host state, agreed to the referendum in 1991, as it lacked either the will or capacity to
oppose the measure, or the resources potentially necessary to maintain unity (Paquin
128). Ethiopian consent to the process and subsequent recognition of Eritrea enabled
O.A.U. support, and uncontested international recognition of Eritrea (Pavkovic, Radan
497).
Origin of Secession
Though Ethiopia rebuffed Italian colonial efforts it ceded the territory of Eritrea to
Italy in 1889 (497). From then until the Second World War, Eritrea existed as an Italian
colony, briefly being united with Ethiopia in 1935 under Fascist Italy until its defeat by
local and British forces, which allowed Ethiopia to reclaim its independence (497). In
contrast, Eritrea became a British trusteeship for the remainder of the war until a decision
could be made as to its future (497). In 1953, the U.N. made the contentious choice of
placing Eritrea in a federation with Ethiopia through the Contractual Federal Act. This act
structured the federation such that Eritrea was separate and autonomous, with its own
constitution and elected government (498). Despite the designs of the U.N. Ethiopia soon
began to violate and undermine Eritrean autonomy (Paquin 130). The culmination of this
pattern of actions occurred in 1962, when Ethiopia revoked the federal status and
nullified its autonomy through annexation, transforming it into the 14th province of
Ethiopia (130). The violation of Eritrean autonomy extended into the linguistic realm,
when contrary to the constitution of Eritrea, Amharic replaced Tigrinya and Arabic as the
official languages (Pavkovic, Radan 46). Though Eritreans appealed to the U.N., it
avoided any responsibility by claiming the matter to be domestic in nature (498).
Review of Secession
These actions served as the catalyst of the secessionist conflict, causing the
emergence of Eritrean secessionist insurgencies and the launch of guerilla warfare
campaigns (Paquin 130). In 1974, the Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, was
overthrown by a military coup, which formed a military regime, also known as the Derg,
led by Menguistu Haile Mariam. The regime proceeded to use brutal military force to
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silence and severely suppress all forms of dissent and ethnic claims (Spears 46). This
effort backfired as it galvanized secessionist movements, induced the emergence of
internal non-exclusive insurgencies of marginalized groups that sought to overthrow the
state, and “drove Ethiopians in increasing numbers toward the rebel fronts” (Spears 46,
71; Paquin 131).
Ethiopia sought to address these insurgencies through the use of military force,
posturing for U.S.S.R. aid as their relationship with the U.S. and the wider regional
context made it unwilling to supply arms (Paquin 130). Previously the U.S. had
maintained support for Ethiopia due to the importance of a communications station in
Eritrea, and its desire for stability in that area (Spears 55). However, technological
advances and relocation of the station removed those incentives. As the U.S. withdrew,
the U.S.S.R. moved in, committing $1,000,000 worth of armaments, hundreds of military
advisors and 11,000 Cuban troops (55). Prior to this, Eritrean separatists had pushed
Ethiopian forces out of Eritrean territory, denying Ethiopian sea access, which
necessitated a restructuring of the army in the view of the regime (57). The shift was
primarily from quality, with 40,000 British trained soldiers, to quantity, with several
hundred thousand poorly trained and poorly disciplined but heavily armed soldiers (55).
In 1982 Ethiopia launched Operation Red Star, a massive effort utilizing its
restructured army and the support of the U.S.S.R., and erased almost of the gains Eritrean
separatists had made, regaining significant control over Eritrean territory (61). Yet it
failed to capture key Eritrean cities, and provided Eritrean separatists with massive
amounts of modern weaponry and equipment whenever the haphazard Ethiopian soldiers
withdrew or surrendered (Spears 61). Soviet support pushed back the gains of the
separatists, however the failure to establish effective control of major cities made these
gains hollow. The dominant separatist group, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front, was
able to construct “structures and institutions that made Eritrea a virtual state within a
state” (61). By setting up government administration, farms, hospitals, and weapon
factories, separatists were able to satisfy their logistical needs at the same time as
fulfilling the qualifiers for statehood (61).
Expanding rebel capacity met with the fall of the Soviet Union and the
withdrawal and discontinuation of support for Ethiopia caused the fall of the government
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(Paquin 130). The transitional government ratified a new constitution allowing for
secession and worked with the EPLF to set the date for a referendum on independence.
The EPLF postponed the referendum until the new government could stabilize (81). Then
in the wake of the U.N. monitored referendum on independence, Eritrea declared its
independence on May 24th 1994, being recognized by Ethiopia, the O.A.U., and the
international community, and obtaining U.N. state membership, as well as acceptance
into the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (84).
Legality of Claim
Eritrea had an excellent legal basis for its claim to independence. Eritrean
separatists argued that theirs was a case of independence, not secession. The basis of their
claim centered on having been historically denied their right to self-determination, first
by Italian colonialism, and then through the U.N. imposed federation with Ethiopia,
which illegally absorbed it soon after (Pavkovic, Radan 498). The claim was set in clearly
defined borders demarcating contiguous territory, over which the separatists exercised
effective control (Herbst 107). Moreover, the claim asserted the right of the Eritrean
peoples, which were neither ethnically nor religiously homogenous. Ethiopia offered a
weak counter to their assertion, claiming that pre-colonial unity had existed under a
single empire, however even this only occurred from 1880 to 1885 (Pavkovic, Radan 43).
Costs, Resources, and External Actors
An array of external factors impacted the conflict or emerged as a result of it. In
terms of external stability, the conflict had a major spillover effect, with an estimated
500,000–600,000 refugees fleeing to Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti (135). An additional
80,000–100,000 exiles and émigrés fled to Arab States (135). At roughly 100,000 strong
in the U.S., the Ethiopian and Eritrean Diasporas supported their respective movements,
but shared the goal of overthrowing the Ethiopian state (Paquin 148). Neighboring and
regional states backed the Eritrean independence movements, particularly Libya, Egypt,
Sudan and Somalia. Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabica, China, South Yemen and Cuba
also provided varying degrees of support (Rothschild, Olunsorola 217). The U.S. and the
Russia came to be involved supporting the push for independence as means for Russia to
demobilize an unaffordable military presence and for the U.S. to bring about stability.
Eritrea lacks resources in the general view, having no significant discovered reserves of
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oil or minerals; however it does possess access to the sea, a potentially critical good for
neighboring landlocked countries.
South Sudan: Overview
Through the right of a referendum on independence held in January 2011, as
designated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the Second Sudanese
Civil War, South Sudan became an independent and sovereign state in July of 2011.
Waged across nearly 60 years and two major civil wars, the conflict was one of the
deadliest and most destabilizing wars in Africa (Pavkovic, Radan 506). The origin of the
conflict lay with colonial consolidation, and subsequent neglect and maladministration by
the government, due in part to the centralizing of power in the North as well as the later
discovery of significant oil holdings in the South (505).
Origin of Secession
After Britain and Egypt conquered Sudan in 1898, Britain administered Northern
Sudan and Southern Sudan separately for the next 40 years or so (Hannum 309). This
differentiation was necessary as the populations differ significantly; the North is of Arab
descent, Islamic, and speaks Arabic while the South is of Black descent, is Christian and
Animist, and speaks indigenous languages and English (308–9). Prior to decolonization
in the 1950s, South Sudan was merged with Sudan, however Egypt and the United
Kingdom gave executive powers and the role of civil administration to the North.
(Pavkovic, Radan 505).
South Sudan never had a chance of contesting the shape of Sudanese
decolonization, as the consolidated borders were solidified in a conference in 1947
(Hannum 307). Though held in Juba, the capital of the South, the only Southern
representatives were on the payroll of the British, who sided with the interests of the
North and of Egypt, which were for unity (307). Following this conference, Southerners
remained politically marginalized through decolonization and the formal independence of
Sudan in 1956 (307). This structure converged with religious and cultural differences and
a weak post-colonial state to create conditions for civil war (Pavkovic, Radan 505).
Review of Secession
The conflict began in 1955, the year prior to Sudanese independence, and was
drive by political frustration and marginalization of the South (506). As the war
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progressed, Southern rebels succeeded in forcing the withdrawal of government forces
(506). These gains contributed to the launch of a military coup in 1958. The military
government combated dissent with force, and sought to weaken Southern political power
and impose Islam and Arabic on the South (Hannum 309). In 1964 these measures
induced massive general strikes in the North in protest of the government, leading to its
fall (309).
The following year, a transitional government was formed, which held a round
table conference in March in an effort to bring an end to the conflict (310). Though being
attended by the representatives of major factions in the North and South, the conference
reached no conclusion, and was undermined by anti-Southern violence (309). Amidst
these overtures of peace, Southern groups set up a provisional government with local
councils, courts, schools and clinics in the areas under Southern control (311). In what
has become a theme of Sudanese administrations, the government was once again
overtaken by a military coup, with Numeiri taking power (311). The First Sudanese Civil
War then ended in 1972, as the government and major rebel groups signed the Addis
Ababa Accords (Pavkovic, Radan 505), which established regional self-government for
the South, granting it control over economic and security matters (Hannum 312). Peace
was also secured through alteration of the constitution to recognize English as a primary
language and the right of the South to religious freedom (312).
The measures of the 1972 agreement were sufficient in bringing about peace, with
minor residual instances of conflict. However plans to construct a canal and divert
Southern water, potentially causing the loss of arable land for 2.6 million people, created
growing tension. The discovery of oil reserves in Southern and border territory in 1979
by Chevron exacerbated the situation, as the state built refineries in the North and sought
to redistrict the oil sectors out of Southern control (Hannum 313). Reacting to these
tensions in 1981, the state removed the regional president of the South, dissolved its
assembly, performed wide scale arrests of dissenters and appointed a military government
(313). These antagonistic tactics extended into 1983, when the government imposed the
‘September Laws’, institutionalizing an ‘Islamization’ of the state, as well as re-dividing
the area of Southern provinces (313).
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In response to these policies and actions, the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement and its armed wing, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army were formed with
the intent of reforming Sudan, and the Second Sudanese Civil War began when Southern
soldiers mutinied against orders to transfer to the North. As the civil war continued, the
government was wracked by two military coups, one in 1985, which led to failed peace
talks, and another in 1989 in the wake of a ceasefire agreement and a debilitating famine
(314). The 1990s witnessed the spread of the conflict to other areas of Sudan as other
groups took up arms against the government, and the efforts of regional powers,
specifically the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, to bring about peace
through talks (Pavkovic, Radan 506).
By 1998, the military position of the North and its ability to sustain the conflict
was rapidly eroding (Natsios 162). The situation of the state worsened considerably in
2001 as infighting between Southern rebels ended and they aligned in opposition to the
state (Pavkovic, Radan 596). These circumstances brought about the signing of the
Machakos Protocol by the SPLM and the state government (506). Through the Protocol,
parties involved agreed that South Sudan had a right to self-determination within the
structure of the Sudanese state. Additionally, the division of state and religion, and the
practical implications of this division were agreed upon (505).
The Machakos Protocol was the first of a series of agreements that formed the
2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the Second Sudanese Civil War and
established the date for a referendum among Southern Sudanese on whether to secede or
not (506). Internal and external factors led to the participation, agreement and general
adherence to the C.P.A. in contrast to past agreements. Internally, the civil war had had a
debilitating economic cost, consuming more than half of the oil revenues of the state
(Natsios 163). Politically, the state believed that the potential secession could be
mitigated and that unity could be made attractive to the Southerners (163). Given that
throughout the majority of the conflict rebels sought to reform the state, nor secede, this
was not implausible. However, Khartoum did not consider how past experiences could
undermine unity arguments, or how to communicate such a message. Externally, United
States intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan made maintenance and improvement of
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relations with Washington a high priority for Khartoum, which required an end to the
civil war (Natsios 171).
The C.P.A. formally established the autonomous Government of South Sudan in
Juba and set up the interim Government of National Unity in Khartoum. The key aspects
were that it allowed the military wing of the SPLM to continue to exist and receive
external assistance to train and modernize, it outlined the sharing of oil revenue between
Khartoum and Juba, and most notably it set January 2011 as the deadline for the
referendum on Southern independence (171). The C.P.A. differed from past agreements
due the level of involvement by external actors, specifically the United States. Though
Khartoum commonly discarded agreements in the past, the U.S. offered the government
incentives to allow for peace and the referendum to take place (169). Beyond this
external pressure, the provisions of the agreement that allowed the Southern military to
train, expand and modernize made cost for disruption high and the plausibility of
significant bargaining chips or territorial gains low (171). These factors and significant
international attention enabled the referendum to be successful held in January of 2011,
and with 99% of Southerners voting for independence, and South Sudan to achieve
sovereign statehood in July later that year (BBC).
Legality of Claim
South Sudan had a clear and powerful claim to independence, although the aim of
Southern actors for the majority of the conflict was reform, not secession. In the
framework of Uti Possidetis, South Sudan had been administered separately from Sudan
under colonialism. Beyond this, South Sudan had been granted the right to secede
through the 2005 C.P.A., to which Sudan had agreed. By repeatedly violating past
agreements that had measures short of independence, Khartoum demonstrated the
intractability of the conflict without a more permanent solution.
Costs, Resources, and External Actors
External actors and factor were significantly involved in determining the course
of the two civil wars and South Sudan’s eventual acquisition of independence. Similar to
the conflict in Eritrea, the conflict in Sudan generated hundreds of thousands of refugees
abroad and internally (UNHCR). Beyond the already discussed role of the United States,
Ethiopia, Israel, Kenya and Uganda all provided direct and or indirect assistance to the
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Southerners (Hannum 326). The South also had support from non-state actors, primarily
non-governmental organizations directly tied to the institutions or constituents of
Christian churches (Natsios 172).14 Though supporting the Southerners represented one
way for other states to indirectly oppose Khartoum, another major potential incentive is
the significant oil reserves found in the Southern region, roughly estimated at 5.4 billion
barrels of oil (Trivett). An expanding Diaspora of Southern Sudanese existed throughout
the conflict, supporting the effort through lobbying efforts, economic support and
ultimately participation in the global referendum.
Katanga: Overview
th

On July 11 1960, Katanga, a province in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
declared independence and called upon states to recognize it (Rothschild, Olunsorola
201).15 Though ethnic and political differences existed between Katanga and the D.R.C.,
the conflict was primarily centered on control over the significant mineral resources and
potential wealth of the province (Pavkovic, Radan 122). The attempt at secession was
relatively brief, being brought to an end by the intervention of U.N. forces at the request
of the D.R.C. without recognition by any other state (122).
Origin of Secession
The origin of the conflict rests with the presence of the mining corporation ‘Union
Miniere du Haut-Katanga’ (Rothschild, Olunsorola 201). Offering mining opportunities
and services paralleling those of the central government, the area had a white settler
population exceeding 30,000 in 1960 (201). The concept of ‘Katanga’ as being distinct
from the rest of the D.R.C. emerged in the 1950s, when immigration into the area
induced fear of displacement and discrimination by the inhabitants. This caused the
different demographics of the region to align (201). The interests of the corporation and
Belgium soon came to match those of the white settlers as the dependent condition of the
country and future profits of corporations was challenged by local political elites (202).
Moise Tshombe integrated these sentiments into his political party, ‘Confederation des
Associations Tribales du Katanga’ (CONAKAT) (202). The party dominated regional
14

These included a wide array of Christian non-state actors, ranging from the evangelical ‘Samaritan Purse,’
conservative Christians, the Catholic Church, black American churches and moderate protestant churches.
15
I encountered conflicting dates as to the secession of Katanga, with some listing the 17th of July rather
than the 11th.
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elections, but did poorly in national elections, securing only two minor posts in the
central government (202). This led the party to perceive itself as having been politically
excluded, and caused it to consider secession as an option (202). CONAKAT initially
planned to secede two days prior to the declaration of independence by the Democratic
Republic of Congo; however Belgian officials persuaded them to delay their efforts
(202). Plans resumed however, when Congolese soldiers mutinied against European
officers and targeted white settlers with violence, destabilizing the central government in
the process as it struggled to subdue the violence (202).
Review of Secession
Taking advantage of the opening provided by the mutiny and the presence of
6,000 Belgian soldiers within its borders, Katanga declared itself as a sovereign and
independent state on July 11th and ‘asked all to recognize in us the right of every people
to self-determination’ (202). Katanga immediately asked Belgium for technical, financial
and military aid, specifically in the interest of training a Kantangan military force (202).
The immediate prospects of Katanga were mixed, as the secession effort had the
resources of the settlers as well as those of the mining corporation. Belgium did not
recognize Katanga but did provide assistance and had its troops in the territory disarm
soldiers loyal to the central government (202). Its initial internal prospects severely
contrasted with its international presence. African states opposed the secession, viewing
it as a plot to undermine the independence of the D.R.C. and enable Europeans to further
exploit the resources of the area (202). States throughout Asia expressed similar
sentiments (203). Beyond Belgium, other European states did not offer recognition, as
opposition by African and Asian states as well as the timing of the secession, being in the
midst of decolonization, caused the costs of such an action to far outweigh the benefits
(203).
The U.N. also came to oppose the secession, fearing that if successful, Katanga
might set a precedent of both rich regions seceding from poor states, and enabling
challenging of the territorial integrity of post-colonial states (Pavkovic, Radan 122). In
reaction, the U.N. Security Council affirmed the territorial integrity of the D.R.C.,
asserting that the territory was being decolonized as a unified whole (123).
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Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the D.R.C. requested U.N. intervention in
order to end the separatist bid and resolve the situation (Rothschild, Olunsorola 203). The
Security Council agreed, however it primarily sought to deescalate the situation, not
remove the secession (123). Having called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops
previously, the Security Council passed Resolution 146, which authorized the
deployment of a U.N. force, with the objectives of maintaining order, protecting human
lives, and forcing the withdrawal of Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries from the
Area (203). The U.N. Force was then deployed throughout non-separatist territory. U.N.
troops refrained from engaging Katangan forces out of concern for casualties in what
some members of the international community believed was a domestic issue outside the
jurisdiction of the U.N (203).
In response to this, Lumumba ordered the D.R.C. Army to retake Katanga (203).
The deployment of the Army failed to resolve the situation, as the campaign quickly
degenerated into indiscriminate violence and drew into a stalemate when the President
removed Lumumba, and threw the government into chaos. Initially this offered Katanga a
chance to consolidate, however it soon faced a separatist movement within its own
borders that escalated into a second conflict, bearing brutal violations of human rights
(201).
These circumstances drove an alignment of positions among regional and
international actors in favor of ending the conflict (204). However, concern regarding the
potential precedent of such an intervention stymied consensus as to what measures could
be taken, with Asian and African states supporting the use of direct force and European
states largely favoring the use of negotiation (204). Though no clear harmony was
achieved, the Security Council passed Resolution 169, which aimed to maintain the
integrity of the D.R.C. and bring an end to the conflict. The Resolution circumvented
concerns of setting a precedent by authorizing troops on the ground to essentially act as
they saw fit to achieve their objectives, and disarm and remove all foreign forces by any
means necessary (204). U.N. troops proceeded to crush the secession, and obtained
legitimacy afterwards when the Government of Katanga ended the bid for secession on
January 13th 1963, while in exile in Northern Rhodesia (204).
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Legality of Claim
Katanga had no legal basis for its secession. It had not been administered
separately from the rest of the D.R.C., nor had it been politically marginalized or
antagonized by the central government. Its population did not identify as distinct from the
D.R.C. except for a few years leading up to the secession, a point which was itself
undermined by a secession from Katanga in the north. The weak legal basis of its claim is
reflected in the near uniform opposition it met with from the international community.
Lastly, it declared its independence after the D.R.C. had done so and been recognized by
other states. As a result, the Katangan declaration of independence violated the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of the D.R.C.
Costs, Resources, and External Actors
Local, regional, and international actors opposed the secession of Katanga,
denying it recognition or support, except for Belgium in the latter case. Significant
mineral resources, in the form of diamonds and precious metals, played a significant role
in the push for secession; however their presence failed to either sustain the separatists or
induce support for the secession. The conflict did not undermine the external stability of
the area, as the costs of the conflict, economically and on a human level remained within
the country. Finally, though the subject of sympathy from Europeans, Katanga lacked any
type of support beyond that provided by Belgium.
Biafra: Overview
th

On May 30 , 1967, the Republic of Biafra declared its independence from
Nigeria. Issues of identity primarily drove the push for independence, although the
possession of significant oil reserves in the territory declaring independence played a role
in both the preliminary analysis of separatists and the conflict itself. In contrast to
Katanga, Biafra achieved recognition, though it was only to be a handful of states.
Beyond recognition, Biafra received limited support from regional and international
actors, yet the majority of rhetorical, logistical and material support was for the central
government. After 3 years of conflict and famine, Biafran forces surrendered to the
Nigerian High Command on January 14th, 1970 (Pavkovic, Radan 96). Waged primarily
through traditional warfare and amidst starvation and disease, the cost of the conflict
rounded out at an estimated 1,000,000 deaths (96).
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Origin of Secession
The origin of the secession rests with the self-reinforcing inter-ethnic conflict
between elites for control of the state that then devolved to the ground level where groups
of individuals began targeting each other along ethnic lines. Nigeria transitioned into
independence as a federal state, with three federal units, each corresponding with an
ethnic identity majority, with one outlier (98). Over half of the population of Nigeria
could fall into one of these three categories, the interplay of which dominated politics and
civil services, making utilization of ethnicity necessary. The Hausa, numbering around 15
million, were predominantly found in the North of the country. The Yoruba, numbering
10 million, lived in the West and Midwest of the country (98). Lastly, and of significance
for this study, the Ibo, numbering ten million, resided in the East and Midwest. This
placement does not encompass the entirety of individuals who may be perceived or selfidentify as belonging to these groups, instead existing spread across the country.
On January 15th 1966, a group of Ibo army majors staged a coup, killing political
and military leaders of other ethnicities in the process (98). The coup was thwarted
however by Major General Ironsi, an Ibo, who imprisoned the soldiers (98). Ironsi
followed this by abolishing the existing divisions between regions of the federation, and
integrating regional and federal services (98). In May of the same year, large-scale riots
occurred in the North, leading to the massacre of several hundred Ibo (99). Then on the
28th of July, Northern military members launched what they deemed as a countercoup
against Ironsi, deposing him and purging eastern officers (99). Facing a splintering
central government, regional leaders convened to stabilize the situation, however they
failed to reach agreement on a means of resolving the situation. This failure, and the
widening violence against easterners as a result of the countercoup, led the eastern
government to look towards secession (99).
In the wake of the failed conference, the Northern Army killed between 7,000 and
10,000 Ibos in the North. This prompted a mass exodus of Ibos and other Easterners to
the East, estimated to be around 1.5 million. The situation was exacerbated in October
when several hundred more Ibo were killed and hundreds of thousands were expelled
(Pavkovic, Radan 99). Though the majority of Eastern military and government officials
were already convinced of the merits of secession, the declaration of a state of emergency
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by the central government and a redrawing of province borders persuaded those who had
remained opposed to the idea (100).
Review of Secession
th

On May 30 , 1967, the Republic of Biafra declared its independence from
Nigeria, launching a propaganda campaign centered on ethnic differences between Biafra
and Nigeria, beyond calling upon foreign states to provide recognition and support (101).
Advocates for Biafra and the Biafran government’s Swiss public relations firm waged
their campaign by framing the situation through rhetoric, photographs, and footage that
echoed the Holocaust and made an obvious association (Baum). The propaganda
eventually gained the attention of the foreign media, who quickly made it a major focus
for people throughout the world, bringing in unprecedented humanitarian assistance
(101). Despite remaining chaos among the central government, state forces occupied the
Midwest. This offensive quickly stalled and was overrun by the Biafran Army. In what
some historians view as the fatal error of the Biafran secession, the Biafran Army failed
to make use of this victory, opting to wait for reinforcements rather than push for the
capital region and potential force the central government to consent to the secession. As
the central government stabilized itself, it recaptured the Midwest, and came to encircle
Biafra and occupy all of its coastal areas by 1968 (101). A stalemate arose due to external
aid mitigating the impact of the siege, however improved armament of the state forces
and food and medicine shortages eventually led to the collapse of Biafran forces, and
occupation of the territory by state forces. Then on January 9th , 1970, Biafran forces
surrendered, bringing an end to the conflict (101).
Legality of Claim
From a strict legal perspective, Biafra had no legal basis to secede. It was not
administered separately under colonialism, nor did domestic Nigerian law enable such an
act. Biafra was ethnically and religiously distinct from the rest of the country, being
primarily Ibo and Christian. However, pockets of different groups existed throughout the
country, and were often integrated into local communities. The violence that precipitated
the secession was significant, as too was that which occurred over the course of the
conflict. The value of these factors as evidence of the necessity for a separate state was
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undermined by lack of state directed violence, and the unity of other provinces and ethnic
groups with the state.
Costs, Resources, and External Actors
On an external level, the O.A.U. opposed the secession, repeatedly trying to bring
about peace and calling upon ‘the secessionist leaders to cooperate with the Federal
authorities for the purpose of restoring peace and unity to Nigeria’ (Baum). Though
formally opposed, the issue split the O.A.U (Pavkovic, Radan 101). Tanzania, Gabon,
Ivory Coast, and Zambia extended recognition of Biafra, acknowledging the need for
unity and territorial integrity, but arguing that these goals could not be achieved without
consideration for the conditions necessary. Beyond the O.A.U., Haiti and South Africa
also recognized Biafra (101).
The state received the majority of material support, being armed and supplied by
the U.K., the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., varying from light arms to planes and heavy artillery.
Biafra received support indirectly from Gabon, Israel, South Africa, China and France,
mainly in the form of light arms (101). On the non-state front, Biafra received support
from the International Red Cross, and joint church aid in the form of food and medicine
(101). Although the conflict was highly intense, it was relatively short and external
instability was limited (Baum).
Somaliland: Overview
On the 18th of May 1991, the Republic of Somaliland declared its independence,
repealing the Union Act of 1960, and returning to its original status and borders prior to
its federation with Somalia (Paquin 156). After resolving an initial period of internal
conflict that lasted until 1997, Somaliland has progressively met and exceeded the
qualifications of statehood: possessing an operational government, stable and effective
institutions, a functional economy and having held both a referendum on the constitution
and multi-party democratic elections (152). However, despite these indicators and a
strong legal claim to statehood, it only possesses de facto recognition from other states
(Pavkovic, Radan 503).
Origin of Secession
From 1897 until decolonization, British Somaliland existed as a British colony,
distinct from Somalia (Paquin 152). On the 26th of June 1960, Somaliland declared its
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independence and was recognized by the U.S. and 35 other states (152). Shortly after
obtaining independent statehood, Somaliland passed the Union Act of 1960 and joined
with Italian Somalia to form a federal republic, which was relatively homogenous
ethnically, linguistically and religiously (153). The nature of this union shifted though
when the president of Somalia unified the two states by means of a unilateral decree,
without basis in a treaty or the consent of Somaliland. This amalgamation was then
reinforced through a tyranny of the majority, when a constitution affirming the existence
of a single state was put to referendum and supported by Italian Somalis (153).
Review of Secession
Events in Mogadishu altered the political landscape considerably in 1969, when
Siad Barre launched a military coup against the state, seizing power, suspending the
constitution, dissolving the legislature, and nationalizing private industry (153). Barre
initially founded a military regime with the backing of the U.S.S.R.; however, his goal of
uniting Somalis within one greater Somali state and consequent invasion of Ethiopia
caused the U.S.S.R. to withdraw support, a gap that the U.S. cautiously filled (154).
In the 1980s, lingering dissent and further political marginalization brought about
the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM), which initially sought to
overthrow Barre and restore the initial federal state arrangement (154). In 1988, operating
out of Ethiopia with the support of the Addis Ababa, the SNM pushed Barre’s forces out
of important cities, Hargeisa and Burao. The state military regime responded through a
campaign of aerial bombardment, focusing heavily on urban areas (Paquin 154). By the
close of the 1980s, deaths estimated to have resulted from the conflict exceeded 50,000
(154).
Somaliland was not alone in its conflict against the regime as other groups,
notably the United Somali Congress and the Somali Patriotic Front, also waged war to
overthrow Barre (155). The weight of these conflicts resulted in a shift in the nature of
the secessionist conflict over the course of the 1990s, as the central government lost
administrative functionality and military capacity in 1990 and then dissolved shortly after
in 1991 (155). Despite having brought about the fall of the Barre regime, the SNM was
alienated from efforts to reform a federal state by infighting among other anti-Barre
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factions and a sense of exclusion due to the unilateral formation of a new government by
the United Somali Congress (Pavkovic, Radan 501).
Following internal reconciliation, the Republic of Somaliland declared its
independence on the 18th of May 1991, repealing the Union Act of 1960 that originally
incorporated it into a federation with Somalia (501). Citing its previous status as a
separate, independent and sovereign state and delineating its borders as those it originally
held, Somaliland asserted itself as a case of dissolution, not secession (Paquin 155).
However, as no government existing in Mogadishu was considered competent, no
consent could be acquired for the dissolution, a condition that led the O.A.U. to oppose
recognition (156–7).
Conflict embroiled Somaliland once more however, as loyalists to the state
launched attacks, and internal dissent arose due to issues of political representation and
efforts to demobilize soldiers (Paquin 160). By 1997, internal stability and relative peace
was reacquired, and external stability was finally established, hemming the generation of
refugees, a major issue in the past with over 300,000 Somalilanders being displaced to
Ethiopia alone in the 1980s (Pavkovic, Radan 501–2). From this point onward,
Somaliland has increasingly not only fulfilled the basic requirements of statehood but
also demonstrated its functional capacity as a state and government. Beyond improving
its economy, multi-party democracy was instated, with a referendum on the constitution
that identified Somaliland as separate and independent of Somalia passing (Paquin 161).
Somalia remains unstable and without a competent and capable central
government, and in the two decades since its declaration of independence Somaliland
remains without de jure recognition by any state (Pavkovic, Radan 502). However, de
facto recognition has been achieved with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, the U.S. and some
other states (Paquin 161).
Legality of Claim
Somaliland holds a relatively strong legal basis for its claim to independence. It
argues that its independence is not secessionist in nature but rather an act of dissolution.
Though the African Union has remained opposed to this as Somalia has not consented to
this dissolution, the forced unification of the two separately recognized states and
violation of the legal basis of the federation in doing so supports the argument of
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Somaliland. That a significant amount of the international community and major powers,
such as the United States, initially recognized Somaliland when it first obtained
independence undermines to a degree the notion that the re-extension of recognition
would set a precedent for secession. On the issue of territory, the proposed territory of
Somaliland is that which it originally was recognized as possessing and this claim does
not infringe on the recognized territory of any other state except Somalia.
Costs, Resources, and External Actors
Though Somaliland is relatively isolated from the violence found throughout
much of Somalia, the conflict stage left at least 50,000 dead with an estimated 180,000
civilians displaced within Somaliland and 300,000 displaced within neighboring states
(Pavkovic, Radan 502). However, the shift in the nature of the conflict, marked by the
loss of capacity by the central government to oppose the independence has led to
mitigated continued internal and external costs and impact on stability.
Significant resource reserves have not been found to exist in Somaliland as of
this time, though exploration rights from the 1980s to parts of its territory remain in the
hands of oil companies (Paquin 168). Similar to Eritrea though, Somaliland does have
significant coastal access, an important physical feature in the consideration of regional
actors and political dynamic (Pavkovic, Radan 503). In part due to this coastal access,
Ethiopia has consistently provided support for Somaliland. Egypt, with the backing of
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, has opposed the secession, to stymy Ethiopia (503).
Kenya has supported the Somali state due to its investment in the Transitional
Government of Somalia (503). Beyond the regional level, South Africa has provided
support to Somaliland, and the UK has been involved in pushing for support of
recognition (503). On the note of support, Somaliland does possess a Diaspora, however
it is relatively small, unorganized and split between different countries (Paquin 160).
Differentiating the Exceptions
Examination of the cases of Eritrea, South Sudan, Biafra, Katanga and Somaliland
enable the identification of local, regional and international factors that may explain their
differing outcomes and offer insight beyond the specifics of each case. Factors drawn
from the case studies are distilled to their basic form in the interest of being transferable
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or able to find commonality among variations of details. Factors will be identified at the
local, regional and international levels. Each will be discussed in terms of its potential
merit for determining the outcome of a secession, and examples from the case studies
will be drawn in support of this. These factors will come to form an analytical
framework.

Local Level Factors
Separatist movements do not possess the guarantee of survival that states hold
(Jackson 3). Separatist movements must not only avoid destruction by the original state
and non-state factions, but must also maintain a sufficient level of functionality to
continue their bid for statehood.
The first local factor is whether or not the host state is capable of opposing the
secession. Where it cannot, the state may be more broadly dysfunctional, and be
considered legally incompetent, and incapable of consenting to a secession. In all of the
case studies, the host state of the separatist movement is at least initially capable of
opposing the secession, or the groups that shift to separatist agendas (it would need to be
capable enough to antagonize such groups sufficiently to drive them to secede in the first
place). Pierre Englebert’s thesis on the deficit of separatism in Sub-Saharan Africa
supports this, as he asserts that elites and marginalized groups will generally seek to take
control of the state rather than seek to secede, given the difficulty of secession and the
relatively valuable nature of control in Africa over extant state institutions (Englebert,
Hummel 405).
The second significant local level factor is whether or not the state is able to
exercise effective control over the separatist territory. If the host state is able to reassert
effective control over the territory in question, this tends to indicate the destruction or
crippling of the separatist movement. If not signifying destruction on the battlefield, this
may show a denial of resources, and affect the analysis of other actors. As Katanga and
Biafra display, when forces representing or acting on behalf of the state took possession
of the territory, the claim was withdrawn and the bid ended. However, the Eritrean case
shows that if the host state captures the territory through especially destructive tactics, but
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fails to gain complete control, the backlash may be greater than the initial opposition.
Thus, reestablishing effective control requires time and a relative degree of stability.
As the state and central government have access to state resources and are able to
receive logistical and military support from other states and organizations, it tends to be
better equipped than the separatists. Yet, as the case of Eritrea demonstrates, this support
may backfire if the host state troops are poorly trained or disciplined, and are captured by
or defect to the separatist. The capacity of a secession to survive and defeat the forces of
the central government relies upon support networks, such as a Diaspora, through which
separatists are able to acquire supplies and assistance. For example, significant food aid
was provided by religious organizations to separatists during the conflicts in Nigeria and
Sudan (Natsios 172). Thus, whether or not a secession possesses a support network is
important in determining its longevity and fate.
These factors then tie into the fourth and fifth significant elements, the intensity of
the conflict, and its duration. A high intensity conflict incentivizes internal and external
actors to directly or indirectly intervene to end the secession, due to the debilitating
economic and human cost, as well as the effect the conflict has on the stability of the
government and the rest of a state. Protracted conflicts tend to have residual effects that
may induce subsequent cycles of violence. The duration of a conflict commonly relates to
its intensity (though if a state is unable or unwilling to suppress the separatists then the
two may not be related). In both Katanga and Biafra the conflict was relatively short
when compared to that of South Sudan and Eritrea.
Regional Level Factors
The effect of a conflict on its surrounding region represents another significant
factor in the outcome of a secession. The conflicts in Katanga, Biafra, and Somaliland all
have been relatively contained within the area of the host state. In contrast, the Eritrean
and South Sudanese cases had large impacts on the stability of the region via generations
of refugees, the use of neighboring territory as bases, the necessity of border defense, the
loss of trade and economic growth, and other spillover effects.
Regional actors have served key roles in the outcome of a secession through
provision of material and political support to either the state or the separatist movement.

https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2012/iss1/16

36

Kuntz: Redrawing Borders in Africa

291
Who regional actors support depends on their relations with the host state, and how the
outcome of the secession could affect their interests.
International Level Factors
Ultimately, the outcome of a secession is determined at the international level, as
the present nature of the international system is such that once recognized, and a member
state of the United Nations, the juridical sovereignty of a state cannot be removed. While
factors at a local level may determine the longevity of a secessionist movement, and
regional factors mitigate or reinforce their effect, without recognition as a sovereign state,
the separatists remain arguably unsuccessful. As discussed in section 5-4, the extension
of recognition to a separatist entity has potential domestic and international political and
legal repercussions. Through the case studies, three international factors appear to have
an influential role in the outcome of a secession.
The most fundamental factor is whether or not the separatist entity fulfills the
basic requirements of statehood, as without these no recognition could be extended.
Whether or not a secession has a legal claim to independence is also a significant factor.
Different variations of a legal claim to secession appear in the cases of South Sudan,
Eritrea, and Somaliland. Finally, other states and non-state actors may be driven by
benefits that successful secession would bring about; thus whether or not the separatist
region possesses resources is a potentially significant factor.
Applying the Framework: Trends and Findings
When viewed together, we are left with the following list, with the answers being
yes or no unless indicated otherwise:
Domestic Factors
1) Host State Capacity

(Host Capacity)

2) Exercise of Effective Control by State Over Secessionist Territory
(

(Effective Control)

3) Presence of a Support Network for Separatists

(Support Network)

4) Intensity of Civil War

(Conflict Intensity)

a. High

b. Low

c. None

5) Duration of Civil War
a. Long
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Regional Factors
1) Conflict generated regional external instability

(External Instability)

2) Regional Actors Support of Secession

(Regional Support)

a. Yes

b. No

c. Mixed

International Factors
1) Does Secession Fulfill the Basic Requirements of Statehood? (Statehood Req.)
2) Does Secession have Legal Claim?

(Legal Claim)

3) Does Separatist Territory Possess Resources?

(Resources)

By constructing this list into an investigative framework, they can be applied to all
of the case studies:
Determinants of Secession Outcome
Factors

Eritrea

South Sudan

Somaliland

Katanga

Biafra

Host
Capacity
Effective
Control
Support
Network
Conflict
Intensity
Conflict
Duration
External
Instability
Regional
Support
Statehood
Requirements
Legal Claim

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

High

High

None

High

High

Long

Long

None

Short

Short

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Mixed

No

Mixed

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Resources

Yes*

Yes

Yes*

Yes

Yes

* Indicates non-traditional resources, specifically coastal access and the potential
existence of material resources.
Research Findings
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On the domestic level, where the host state was able to exercise effective control
over the separatist territory, the secession failed. In all cases except Somaliland, the host
state was capable of responding to the secession. It should be noted that when the SNM
pushed for reform of the state, the Somali central government was able to react. The lack
of state capacity may have enabled Somaliland to continue to exist, however it may also
explain its lack of success, as the central government is also regarded as legally
incompetent. The presence of a support network, though varying in form and level of
strength, does not appear to act as any particular indicator of the outcome of a
secessionist movement.
Cross-analysis of the intensity and duration of a secessionist conflict however,
reveals a correlation between instances of long, high intensity conflict and successful
cases of secession in Eritrea and South Sudan. Katanga and Biafra both generated high
intensity conflicts but only for short periods of time, before being eliminated. Somaliland
represents an exception, as Somalia has lacked the capacity to oppose it for the duration
of its declared independence. On the regional level, extending from the nature of the civil
war, whether or not a secessionist conflict generates external instability also seems to be
a determinant. Though the separatist conflict in all of the cases had an impact on the
citizens of the host state and the population residing in the separatist territory, Eritrea and
South Sudan by nature of their duration and intensity caused significant regional
instability due to spillover conflict, refugees, and other detrimental effects. Somalia itself
may still generate regional instability; however its internal struggles are distinct from that
caused by Somaliland.
Regional support does not prove to be of any significance in and of itself. In all of
the cases the O.A.U. and the A.U. has maintained opposition to the secession, only
altering its official line after recognition is achieved or after the host state has consented
to the secession. In both of the exceptions to the norm, no regional actor has extended
recognition without an internal process allowing for a legal secession. Where regional
support has been aligned in support of the secession, tracking the support given is a
difficult task. However, insofar as it indicates the lack of support for the host state by its
neighbors, regional support will reinforce domestic factors.
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Whether or not a secessionist group is able to fulfill the requirements of statehood
does not offer much insight. Given the highly politicized nature of recognition in relation
to the requirements of statehood, this is to be expected. That being said, the exceptional
qualifications of Somaliland appear to be mitigated by other factors, potentially the lack
of regional or international costs for maintaining the status quo. The presence of a legal
claim does appear to relate to the outcome of a secession, however Somaliland stands out
here, having existed as a recognized sovereign state before being illegally absorbed into
Somalia. The disparity between the strong legal claim of Somaliland and its present lack
of statehood also seem to point to idea that there is insufficient incentive to make the cost
of non-recognition exceed the cost of recognition. Both Biafra and Katanga lacked legal
claims, which undermined their efforts to obtain recognition.
Surprisingly, the presence and nature of resources are not, in and of themselves a
strong predictive or determining element. Both Eritrea and South Sudan possess
resources (coastal access and oil reserves respectively). However, the presence of similar
coastal access in Somaliland, an important incentive for nearby landlocked countries,
undermines non-material resources. On the material side, both Katanga and Biafra
enclosed major mineral and oil reserves respectively, yet both bids proved unsuccessful.
The difference between Katanga, Biafra, and South Sudan may rest with their ability to
survive. In other words, the extension of recognition by states that would benefit was
withheld due to the possibility of failure. Coastal access is also more dependent on the
current political dynamic between regional actors, whereas minerals and oil require
stability and sovereignty to be extracted.
A Defense of the Research Method
The methodology used to identify these factors and in turn formulate a
hypothesis, is open to criticism—particularly concerns of confirmation bias, or circular
reasoning. However, this thesis seeks to address a deficit present in current literature on
the subject, and identify factors that potentially differentiate cases of secession, not to
explicitly prove one above the others. Undoubtedly, the creation of a theory involves a
degree of proving the potential validity of the idea, but it is not the same as to prove it
superior to others, an area where such confirmation bias could undermine the integrity of
the findings (van Evera 68, 71). These factors are drawn from across the five case studies
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and then reapplied across all of them, satisfying the need to test the antecedent conditions
involved (73).
Cases of secession may be rare but they have important implications and effects
on the areas where they occur. Research on the subject is critical for future policy
evaluation of secessions or even internal conflict. A better understanding of which factors
are important, and how they interact and affect the actors involved is necessary to
accurately judging a situation, and constructing solutions.

Conclusion
The principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity delimit the boundaries of the
international state system and are mechanisms for maintaining stability. Secession
enables an asymmetrical challenge of these tenets: it pits the stability of the international
system against the stability of individual states. The international system acts in the
interest of its own survival, which is apparent in the evolution of international law and its
capacity to address novel or exceptional threats. Reflecting this reality, it follows that the
intensity, duration, and external impact of a secessionist conflict are the primary
determinants of the outcome of a secession. The legal viability of a secession should
serve as a central factor. However, as comparison of Eritrea and South Sudan with
Somaliland showed, the strength of a legal claim is dependent on the cost of continued
conflict outweighing the domestic and international consequences of secession in the
perspective of external state actors. Beyond their immediate cost, and in contrast to the
cases of Katanga and Biafra, Eritrea and South Sudan demonstrated both intractability
and a high probability of continued conflict at a similar or greater cost.
The opposition of the international community to the practice of secession except
in the most extreme conditions may discourage potential secessionists and ensure a
general measure of stability, but it has debilitated the development of consensus on the
conditions of acceptable secession, and thus minor stability is broadly achieved at the
cost of major conflict and selective instability. The reluctance of the international
community to embrace secession is understandable; the relations with existing states and
their allies are more valuable than those with a non-state actor. Efforts to determine the
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conditions of secession provoke fears of a slippery slope. This is significant for those
countries with separatists of their own or those that are more dependent on their juridical
statehood than their own power to uphold their sovereignty. Yet, as the two exceptions
have shown, the international system may be forced to come to terms with the necessity
of a secession when the cost is sufficient and the consent of the host state is given, so
long as it is judged to be legally competent.
As it stands, the necessity of a high-cost conflict and consent of the host state
reflect the operating mentality of the international system and the complexity of the issue
at hand. Waiting for these conditions to occur is not a viable means of ending or
preventing instability and conflict. This is because the way a secession ends affects the
future of participants on all sides (Tir 716–719). As the conflict continues and worsens,
human and economic costs rise and grievances distill throughout the population, and the
future of the region is threatened.
Concern does not rest simply with the actions of the general population, but their
vulnerability to war rhetoric by their leaders. According to Jaroslav Tir, the leaders of the
new state and the host state both have incentives to return to war (716–719). The leaders
of the host state may seek to regain lost territory in order to regain control over natural
resources, historical purposes, and/or to shore up domestic support (715). The leaders of
the new state may seek to gain even more territory, as they may have only gained some of
the territory they had claimed (719). The restart of conflict post-secession is a serious
problem, as each side is legally able to receive logistical and material aid, and direct
support from other states (Shaw 1042–3).
Interdependent economic structures, an expanding regime on the existence of
human rights, and the potential threat of non-state actors through acts of terrorism and
other means of non-traditional warfare necessitate a vigilant role for the international
community in order to maintain stability. Failure to address cases of secession until the
separatist movement displays its ability to survive enables states to temporarily
circumvent potential infringements on the sovereignty of others. Yet, the ignorance of the
international community to the legal basis of the secession, specifically Somaliland,
undermines the delicate effort to strike a necessary balance.

https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2012/iss1/16

42

Kuntz: Redrawing Borders in Africa

297
The present lack of procedure and conditions for secession may discourage some
actors by nature of the difficulty of the process, but can encourage others, as the myth of
creating homogenous states persists, and the right to self-determination continues to be
considered a generalized right to secede (Johnson 143–148). Determining the requisite
conditions for a secession is a necessary step if secession continues to persist in the
future, and until the right to self-determination no longer appears to be a generalized right
to secede, it will.
Granting statehood to Somaliland would engrain basic acceptable conditions for
secession, and show a differentiation between secessions with a legal basis and those
without. This initial act would offer a stepping-stone for the system to reconcile the
matter before it proves more debilitating, and discourage the more opportunity-seeking
separatists.
Given the value of sovereignty and the potential for exclusion in any domestic
power arrangement, separatist movements will persist in their efforts. That being said, it
is in the interest of the international system to develop a functional framework for
acceptable secession, without which intractable highly damaging civil wars that bring
about the consent of the host state will remain the path to statehood, setting up the
conditions for state failure.
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